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Abstract—The automotive industry is a dynamic industry that
is constantly evolving and changing with the advancements of
technology. As cars become more technology dependent, the
threat landscape and likelihood of a cyber-attack becomes greater
and inherently larger as issues arise. With the introduction
to automation and increased use of embedded systems and
infotainment systems, modern cars have become a pillar piece
of the Internet of Things network.
This research details an in-depth study into the vulnerabilities
and risks surrounding the current and future state of the auto-
motive industry, highlights the most safety-critical components of
the modern car, providing a holistic threat landscape to improve
security awareness and posture regarding automotive security.
It also demonstrates the utilisation of this analysis with the
integration of an education package built on top of a hardware
module based on a Raspberry Pi, that emulates its own CAN
Bus network that individuals can interact with as if it was a
vehicle to provide education on CAN hacking. This device has
the potential to be attached to education ranges and labs which
can help educate individuals on different security skills to help
improve security awareness and knowledge.
Index Terms—automotive security, control area network, CAN
Bus, risk-based approach, Arduino Teensy
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The automotive industry is a rapidly and constantly evolving
industry, encompassing and embracing IT networks, comput-
ing and, information and communications technology (ICT)
systems in general. As cars become more technology depen-
dent and connected, the threat landscape and likelihood of
a cyberattack becomes greater and inherently larger. With the
introduction to automation and increased use of embedded sys-
tems (such as in car infotainment systems), modern cars have
become a showcase of Internet of Things (IoT) capabilities. At
the same time, the increased connectivity would provide wider
opportunities for malicious actors exploiting the devices. With
this larger attack surface, it can be argued that the likelihood
of a cyberattack is higher, with vehicular entities being more
prone and vulnerable to attack and compromise.
In this paper, an approach towards developing a training
methodology for the aspects of cyber-physical systems (CPS)
security to the undergraduate students in computing degrees
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is presented. As in CPS, the physical plane interacts with the
cyber plane through IoT sensors and actuators that serve as the
conduit between these two worlds, it is imperative to realise
that it is possible for risks to propagate across these two planes.
As such, the traditional assumptions and goals of cybersecurity
- pertaining to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability - will
need to be extended to include also safety.
As a vehicle for demonstrating the above concepts, we
consider the case of connected autonomous vehicles (CAV).
Our methodology follows a risk based approach; that is, we
initially enumerate all identifiable risks associated with a CAV
environment and we introduce a narrative where a threat actor
can attack aspects of this environment. To this end, we develop
an education pack with appropriate learning outcomes and
show how these risks are met through the deployment and
delivery of a test bed using custom hardware based on a
Raspberry Pi, a programmed Arduino Teensy 3.2 replicating
Engine Control Unit (ECU) heartbeats that are relayed through
a Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus Transceiver and a
PiCAN Shield to create an isolated CAN Bus network which
is interacted through the Raspberry Pi.
II. CYBERSECURITY IN THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR
Modern automotive designs contain hundreds of cyber-
physical modules, connectivity components and microproces-
sors that work together in unison to control a vehicle mechani-
cally and electronically. Security remains to be an ongoing and
fundamental challenge in the design and manufacturing pro-
cess of a vehicle [1]. Automotive security is driven by safety-
critical decisions, challenged by the evolution of technology
and the need for real-time mitigation against environmental
threats [1]. Some identified technologies include the following:
• Infotainment Systems and Components
• Driver Assistance Capabilities (e.g. Collision Detection,
Emergency Braking, Engine/Tyre Sensors)
• Physical Security (e.g. CAN Bus/Onboard Diagnostics
(OBD)-II Diagnostics)
• Remote Entry Security (e.g. Keyless Entry Attacks)
• Telematics Modules
• GPS/Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (e.g.
Navigation System or Positional Sensors)
• Over-The-Air Software/Firmware Updates
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As CAVs continue to be introduced into the automotive
market, identification of the security risks that these vehicles
may impose will keep its importance. Autonomous vehicles
heavily rely on a variety of sensors, radars, and camera
components to operate correctly and safely. Attacks on these
sensors can prove fatal for drivers and passengers alike; it
is important to mitigate threats that target these components.
Attacks against autonomous sensors can have heavy conse-
quences; in addition to this type of attack, there is also a threat
against the Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning
(ML) aspects of an autonomous vehicle [2]. Malicious actors
can tamper the decision-making algorithms within AI or ML
features or tamper with the inputs these features receive.
Combining these attack vectors constructs a wide attack sur-
face on a typical autonomous vehicle. With the vulnerability
surface exacerbated with the introduction of connected and
autonomous technologies – security assessments and decisions
must be made to protect the safety-critical aspects of the
vehicle.
Socio-technical measures must be implemented into the
industry to ensure holistic mitigation can be applied to re-
duce the security risks and raise awareness on a problem
realm within security. The interactions between people and
technology remain pinnacle to the three pillars of information
security management: people, processes, and technology [3].
The introduction and implementation of education and aware-
ness programs will help individuals understand the problem
area and realm with deeper comprehension. By creating an
education exercise, such as the artefact built in this project,
individuals that have a technical and/or security background
in the automotive industry can widen their skill set and
understanding to initiate principles such as security-by-design
– combating initial risks from the design stage in the man-
ufacturing process of vehicles. Education exercises are also
fundamental for academia and students within the security
field – it is critical that those in education remain up-to-date
in developing their skill sets and in-line with the times.
III. ATTACK SURFACE AND RISK ANALYSIS OF CAVS
To establish a deeper understanding of the problem realm
and achieve a greater situational awareness of the automotive
industry and its relevant security posture, this section details
the research undertaken to identify current technologies that
can be exploited and future technologies that have the potential
in being compromised.
A. Current State Automotive Security
Modern cars are becoming more connected and complex,
linking a plethora of connected components and technologies
– a new age of vehicles is now available within the automotive
market. Connected technologies allow vehicles to be more
efficient, passengers and drivers to be more comfortable, and
safety systems to be more accurate and reliable – however,
with these introduced technologies, connected systems are
becoming more vulnerable to security attacks [4]. In the
current state of the systems, the attack surface can be extended
TABLE I
ATTACK SURFACE FOR THE CURRENT STATE OF AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY
System Asset Threat CIA Affected
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on the aforementioned identified technologies on security and
supportive systems.
Table I outlines the attack surfaces for the contemporary
technologies. The attack surface is provided with the assets
included in the technology, the threat and the affected infor-
mation security attribute given in the Confidentiality-Integrity-
Availability model.
B. Future State Automotive Security
The future of automotive is moving towards a more con-
nected and autonomous paradigm, with a predicted 8 mil-
lion fully autonomous vehicles available and roadworthy by
2025 [13]. In addition to current automotive technologies and
integration into the Internet of Things (IoT), the design of
vehicles is transforming towards an AI-driven future – utilising
current connected technologies and exemplifying them to aid
the movement towards driverless as the norm. To cope with
the pressures of an Intelligent Transport System (ITS), new
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TABLE II
ATTACK SURFACE FOR THE FUTURE STATE OF AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY
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infrastructure technologies such as the introduction of 5G
Cellular and ITS-G5 are utilised to support the growth of
smart cities and vehicles. V2X communications are a funda-
mental part of the ITS paradigm of the future. The future of
smart cities and V2X data exchange will utilise the current
technologies and introduce further IoT components such as
roadside technology and real-time traffic and environment data
to produce safety alerts and improve the efficiency of the
connected and autonomous vehicle [14].
The advancement of such technologies are industry-driven
by an expectation for a progress in CAVs and IoT integra-
tion. With a predicted growth of an autonomous future, it
is paramount to implement the correct safety and security
protocols to cope with introduced technologies and their
vulnerabilities and/or flaws. Table II detail a selection of tech-
nologies exercised in autonomous and connected vehicles of
the future, including their identified risks and vulnerabilities.
C. Vulnerabilities
As part of a risk based approach, the research conducted
in this section continues with the vulnerability analysis of the
components stated in Table I and the vulnerabilities for the
components of CAVs are stated in Table III. In most cases,
the assets include and utilise components from generic CPU
and micro-controller producers such as Intel, ST, Qualcomm
etc. In addition to this, the ECUs may contain or interact with
the operating systems that are running on those devices such as
Android or Linux kernels. As such, these components inherit
generic OS vulnerabilities as well, however for the purpose
of this paper we focus only to those that are specific to CAV
systems.
An example attack vector containing the vulnerabilities
listed in Table III can be as follows;
1) Initial access via a cellular network (CVE-2018-9318)
2) Unauthorised code execution with CVE-2017-9647
3) Bluetooth jamming using the vulnerability on OBD-II
ports with CVE-2019-12797
TABLE III
VULNERABILITIES, THEIR CVE CODES AND CVSS SCORES
Vulnerability CVE Id Affected Systems CVSS Score
CVE-2017-9633 An Improper Restriction of
Operations within the Bounds
of a Memory Buffer issue af-
fecting many brands includ-
ing some models of BMW,
Hyundai, Nissan and Ford
8.3
CVE-2017-9647 Stack based buffer overflow on
ECUs affecting many brands
including some models of
BMW, Hyundai, Nissan and
Ford
6.6
CVE-2017-14937 Airbag Control Units –
through CAN Bus, OBD-II
Ports
4.7
CVE-2018-9318 Remote attack via a cellu-
lar network to TCU affect-
ing BMW vehicles produced
in 2012 through 2018
10
CVE-2019-12797 OBD-II – sending arbitrary
commands to the OBD-II Bus
through Bluetooth
7.5
CVE-2020-12323 Privilege Escalation on Intel’s
ADAS IE
7.5
4) Destruction and detonation of airbags using malevo-
lent access to OBD-II ports (CVE-2017-14937)
D. Threat actors
In order to complete the risk assessment, we enumerate the
threat actors and their motives against CAV assets. Under-
standing threat actors and their motives can help alleviate the
understanding of the security posture in the automotive indus-
try and improve security controls and practices to enhance
security defence mechanisms and mitigations. By profiling
potential attackers, we can zoom into their capabilities and
identify the most detrimental risks and likely attack methods.
The following types of threat agents would be relevant to
the automotive ecosystem [18]:
• Security researchers. Often from academia, industry or
government – security researchers are typical, although
not always, recruited through schemes such as bug bounty
programs to find security vulnerabilities that haven’t been
identified yet. Issues identified are usually disclosed to
vendors and manufacturers, however, many researchers
also opt to share discovered vulnerabilities either through
online forums or in large security gatherings such as
conferences. By freely sharing such information, cy-
bercriminals or “script kiddies” may utilise this public
knowledge to maliciously attack vendors using unknown
exploits or attacks.
• Hacktivism groups. Hacktivist groups are often large
groups that use their hacking abilities to demonstrate
or project ideas. Hacktivist groups may be politically
charged, often challenging government – or have internal
motives of their own to promote social justice.
• Script kiddies and pranksters. Individuals with novice
hacking ability and minimal resources, script kiddies and
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pranksters may attack targets using pre-written tools or
exploits to primarily cause nuisance or for prestige in the
hacking culture.
• Owners. Car-hacking tools are already publicly available
for owners to access. Rather than malice, many owners
may want to hack their vehicles or attack security features
to remove manufacturer implemented restrictions. This
may include performance restrictions, e.g. Increasing
engine power.
• Organised crime groups (OCGs). OCGs pose as one
of the biggest threat actors to automotive. Usually host-
ing extensive resources, both financially and knowledge-
based, organised crime groups tend to gravitate towards
a financial motive. Many groups may target stealing cars,
to sell on for profit. Cybercrime syndicates such as OCGs
usually use a collection of attacks that closely follow the
Cyber Kill Chain [19] to achieve objectives. Attacks may
also closely follow the MITRE ATT&CK Framework
[20].
• Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs are of-
ten backed by hostile nations and governments and are
difficult to identify. Mostly used for espionage or cy-
berwarfare, APT groups are often used to target rival
nations and cripple national infrastructure, manufacturers
and vendors. Similar to organised crime groups, APT
groups closely follow the Cyber Kill Chain to achieve
objectives.
• Cyber terrorist groups. These actors utilise computers
and technology to execute attacks to widespread fear
within the general public and/or cause harm or disruption.
The actors’ motives can be diverse, from plain hacktivism
and pranking, to financial gain driven by stealing the actual car,
ransomware (by disabling or assuming control of the car), to
more severe cyber terrorism types of attack, by attempting to
cause major disruptions and even loss of life. As the potential
impact of a compromised car can be severe, it is imperative
that CPS security should be woven into the cybersecurity
curriculum.
IV. EXERCISE DESIGN
In what follows we describe the design process of an
education exercise created to improve automotive hacking
knowledge focused on the CAN Bus manipulation vulnera-
bility within a vehicle as informed by the risk based approach
presented above. In an educational setting, individuals will
be able to interact with the simulated CAN network created
by a custom Raspberry Pi, to represent and replicate how a
malicious actor can attack the CAN network of a car. After
analysing the risks of a modern vehicle, and the risks of future
CAVs - an education exercise focused on a CAN component
was selected as the CAN Bus has always traditionally been
the easiest way to compromise a vehicle. This is due to the
requirement that most cars have to implement CAN as part of
the five protocols used in the on board diagnostic (OBD-II)
standard for modern vehicles.
A. Hardware customisation and integration
The four main hardware modules are the Raspberry Pi, the
PiCAN Shield, the Arduino Teensy and the CAN Transceiver,
as elaborated below:
1) Raspberry Pi 3 Model B: The Raspberry Pi was the
main component of the custom hardware device. It fulfills
the technical requirements needed for the project and has
the capability to support the additional hardware components
needed for the final device creation. Implemented as a core
system, the Raspberry Pi works in unison with the PiCAN
shield to deliver interaction with the created CAN network.
The Raspberry Pi, through a terminal command prompt, uses
the Linux utilities package “can-utils” to send commands to
interact through the PiCAN to manipulate the CAN traffic
generated by the other hardware components.
2) PiCAN Shield: A PiCAN shield is attached to the
Raspberry Pi in order to provide the capability to interact
with CAN. Created by SKPang, the PiCAN uses a MCP2515
CAN controller to allow CAN connections to be created and
managed. The Raspberry Pi working with the PiCAN allows
interaction with the simulated CAN Bus network. The PiCAN
is connected by bolting onto the the Raspberry Pi through a
4 bolt screw terminal and a 40 way connector. The PiCAN is
connected to the Ground (GND) and power pins of the CAN
transceiver and Teensy hardware components.
3) Arduino Teensy 3.2: The CAN Bus network is simu-
lated using an Arduino Teensy 3.2 programmed to generate
fabricated ECU heartbeats that pulsated through the created
CAN network. For the purpose of the exercise, the Teensy
was coded and flashed using the Arduino IDE (C++) with
the added extension library FlexCAN1. Originally written by
Mathew Levett, the code was modified and simplified for the
purpose of this project. The code generated CAN traffic by
pulsating three ECU heartbeats through the network of the
custom device, rather than the hundreds seen in a regular car.
This was done to simplify the CAN traffic produced so that
the exercise could be delivered more efficiently to individuals
with limited automotive hacking knowledge. The Teensy is
connected soldered wires to the CAN Transceiver Transmit
(TX) and Receive (RX) pins and the PiCAN GND and Power
pins.
4) CAN Transceiver: A CAN transceiver serves as an inter-
face to provide successful transmission between the physical
Bus network and the CAN controller. Without a transceiver,
arbitration of sending and receiving CAN messages onto the
physical bus would not be possible. For this project, a TJA1050
CAN Transceiver was used to achieve this – which was
connected via. soldered wires to the Teensy TX and RX pins,
the PiCAN CAN-H/CAN-L pins and GND/Power pins.
These four main hardware components were connected
as shown in the circuit diagram in Fig. 1. The arrows are
representative of the wires added and soldered to connect the
different hardware components; colours have also been used
to separate components for clarity - any coloured component
1https://github.com/collin80/FlexCAN Library
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Fig. 1. Hardware components circuit diagram
notated in the diagram represents the components that form
the CAN Bus network. The physical arrangement of the
components is depicted in Fig 2.
Fig. 2. Annotated hardware
B. Education Pack
Informed by the risk-based approach to identify the threats
and vulnerabilities in a CAV environment, an exercise pack
was developed to accompany the created hardware device
to deliver an education exercise to provide a socio-technical
measure in improving security awareness within automotive
security. To this end, three Intended Learning Outcomes were
specified, as described in Table IV.
Following these ILOs, the approach of developing the edu-
cation pack and exercises was as follows. Brief introductions
to CAN and ECUs were written to contextualise the education
exercise in alignment to “real-life” security issues in vehicles.
Critical to the understanding and delivery of the exercises is
the learners’ familiarity with the terminal, the CAN message
format and the can-utils command toolkit. Table V is an
excerpt from the introduction to the CAN data and toolkit.
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES
Description
ILO1 Appreciate and understand the feasibility to attack a car
using the Control Area Network (CAN)
ILO2 Critically understand the vulnerabilities surrounding the
Control Area Network (CAN)










11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 CAN data
Command toolkit:
candump dumps live traffic from CAN network
cansend send CAN data to CAN network
Following the introductory phase, setup instructions were
provided to allow the individual completing the exercise to
initiate the virtual CAN network. This comprised of bringing
up the CAN interface via. the PiCAN. For convenience, a text
document was created with the needed command to setup the
interface and placed on the user desktop for easy access.
Succeeding the setup phase of exercise pack, three exercises
were written to demonstrate basic CAN hacking and ma-
nipulating techniques: Dumping CAN Data, Replaying CAN
Messages and Injecting Fake CAN Data. The exercises utilised
can-utils commands, which were specified in a “Command
Toolkit” at the start of each exercise alongside a brief exercise
summary specifying how the exercise demonstrates “real-
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world” CAN hacking techniques. Following the practical part
of the exercise, several theoretical questions were written
to test the understanding of the individuals completing the
exercise.
To complete the exercise pack, a brief exercise summary
was written to recap the exercises and align them with “real-
world” CAN hacking, dictating the differences between a
virtual CAN network and hurdles potentially faced practicing
the newly learned skills on an actual vehicle.
V. TRAINING IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
At the core of the educational activity lie the three ex-
ercises. It should be noted that it is recommended that the
exercises should be conducted in the order described in this
paper, primarily because the first one also relates to testing
that the hardware and device in general functions correctly.
More specifically, the exercises can be carried out when the
can0 interface is correctly setup, as can be observed by the
ifconfig command in the Raspbian operating system.
A. Exercise 1: Dumping CAN Data
This exercise primarily focused on familiarising the indi-
vidual with dumping CAN data as a starting point for CAN
analysis and data manipulation.
As with every exercise, a command toolkit detailing the
can-utils commands needed to complete the exercise; a brief
introduction is also provided to describe how the exercise was
relevant in “real-life” CAN attacks. The following follow-up
questions may assess the learner’s comprehension of the topic:
• Why are we dumping the interface can0? (Answer:
this is the interface that the virtual CAN network is
communicating on)
• How many ECUs are there? (This should be a numerical
answer and it relates to the number of simulated ECUs
that are spawned on the device. An example number
would be three.)
B. Exercise 2: Replay Identified CAN Data
This exercise primarily focuses on identifying CAN mes-
sages and replaying them back to the CAN network to
manipulate the traffic. Replay attacks are possible in the CAN
network and the duplicated messages as not distinguishable
from their original. The questions asked would allow the
learner to appreciate the need for timestamping, redundancy
and authentication information in the CAN messages.
C. Exercise 3: Injecting Fake CAN Data
The final exercise instructs the learner to send random data
to the network and is the final exercise to be tested within
the pack. Slightly different from the previous exercises, a
question is asked before and after the exercise is completed.
The question asked before was to help provoke willful thinking
surrounding the exercise – regardless, both were completed to
gauge the success of the exercise:
• Do you think it is possible to send fake/random data to
the network without these being detected? (Answer: yes,
and this relates to the lack of authentication)
• How would one detect/see the injected data? (Answer:
in the terminal using the candump command. However,
this still does not mean that the injections can be distin-
guished from legitimate data)
VI. CONCLUSION
Combining the exercise pack and the hardware device
created allows the education of low-level CAN manipulation.
Mainly aimed at academia, or industry professionals that may
lack knowledge of automotive CAN hacking – this education
exercise was created to empower existing knowledge whilst
practicing theoretical concepts that the target audience may
have encountered in their research or by other means.
As part of the wider collated issues in automotive secu-
rity, this artefact provides a socio-technical measure to help
reduce risks associated with minimal understanding or secu-
rity awareness within automotive security whilst addressing
the vulnerabilities associated with CAN hacking in publicly
available vehicles – focusing on a subset of vulnerabilities
identified through the risk analysis exercise. For future work
more capabilities can be added (such as additional sensors) to
increase its attack surface and expose the learner to a wider
set of vulnerabilities and attacks.
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